"Transcendental nonsense" and system in the law

In 1935, Felix Cohen argued in these pages that the technical terminology o f the law was mere "word-jugglery," and that its practitioners were allowin g "transcendental nonsense" to stand in for the hard work of functional dec isionmaking in the law. Professor Waldron argues that in fact technical leg al vocabulary performs an important function: It flags the systematicity of the law, highlighting the interrelatedness of diverse concepts and doctrin es. Cohen, like later legal postivists, largely denied the importance of su ch systematicity, if he acknowledged it at all. But Professor Waldron sugge sts that valuing such systematicity, and the technical vocabulary that supp orts it, is quite compatible with Cohen's functionalist critique of formali st jurisprudence. In particular, Professor Waldron argues that the role of technical terms in regard to systematicity is critical for the coherence of modern legal systems, which develop in a context of pervasive moral disagr eement and shifting political power.