Mutuality at a distance? Risk and regulation in marine insurance clubs

In this paper I investigate an institution which combines two forms of risk regulation commonly regarded as antithetical. In the governmental mode, as sociated with the rise of capitalism, the welfare state, and commercial ins urance, regulation is centralised and spatially removed from the risk itsel f, and involves the surveillance, prediction, and control of risks posed by large-scale populations of atomised individuals or companies. This is in c ontrast to the older mutual form, in which social relations within communit ies allocate and minimise risks, evident in the moral economy of the peasan try, friendly societies, and the resurgence of discourses of community resp onsibility in the 1990s. Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs are mutual as sociations of the world's shipowners, which insure marine liabilities (incl uding environmental risks). Their communal structure and self-interest in m inimising risks means that they could, and to an extent do, play an importa nt role in regulating marine safety and environmental performance. However, their global scale means that social relations between shipowners are not simply analogous to those within a local community. The P&I Clubs do, in pr actice, employ centralised managers responsible for determining entry stand ards, setting premiums, handling claims, and engaging in loss prevention. T hese activities rest upon the 'scientific' calculation, allocation, and man agement of risks. At the same time the aim is to 'maintain mutuality' among st members, and tacit knowledge and actively produced trust are essential t o this end. I argue that the combination of a mutual structure and a global scale produces a hybrid style of regulation, and the successful applicatio n of rules, incentives, sanctions, and surveillance depends as much on the construction of specific sociospatial relations as on organisational form, with implications for new regulatory designs.