Interdependence in negotiation: effects of exit options and social motive on distributive and integrative negotiation

Citation
E. Giebels et al., Interdependence in negotiation: effects of exit options and social motive on distributive and integrative negotiation, EUR J SOC P, 30(2), 2000, pp. 255-272
Citations number
42
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
ISSN journal
00462772 → ACNP
Volume
30
Issue
2
Year of publication
2000
Pages
255 - 272
Database
ISI
SICI code
0046-2772(200003/04)30:2<255:IINEOE>2.0.ZU;2-G
Abstract
This study extends past research on the impact of alternatives in dyadic ne gotiation by (a) providing negotiators with the mere possibility to negotia te with an outside party and (b) examining the moderating role of the negot iators' social motive. Business students engaged in face-to-face negotiatio ns, which were audio-taped and transcribed. None, one, or both dyad members were provided with an exit option- the possibility to leave the current ne gotiation and start new negotiations with someone else. Dyads were also giv en instructions to maximise own outcomes (egoistic motive) or to consider b oth own and the other's outcomes (prosocial motive). Results showed that, a s expected, dyads with a one-sided exit option engaged in more distributive and less integrative behaviour, adn obtained lower joint outcomes than dya ds having either two-sided or no exit options. However, this effect occurre d only under an egoistic rather than a prosocial motive. No differences wer e found for negotiations with two-sided exit options compared to negotiatio ns without exit options, suggesting one's own exit option counter-balanced by the other's escape possibility. Our results indicate that negotiators wh o wish to maximize personal as well as joint outcomes should try to combine a power advantage in terms of exit options with a shared prosocial orienta tion. Copyright (C) John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.