The 'natural' and the 'formal' (Logic)

The paper presents an argument against a 'metaphysical' conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical struct ure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contras t, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a giv en mathematical structure really odes capture a principle of reasoning. (Mo re generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirica l investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable s tructure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) it is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which ou r reason must deal: ;the realm of the natural', constituted by the things o f our empirical world, and 'the realm of the formal', constituted by the st ructures that we use as 'prisms' to view, to make sense of, and to reconstr uct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on m any foundational problems of logic.