Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity

Citation
Sj. Brams et Pc. Fishburn, Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity, SOC CHOICE, 17(2), 2000, pp. 247-267
Citations number
19
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
ISSN journal
01761714 → ACNP
Volume
17
Issue
2
Year of publication
2000
Pages
247 - 267
Database
ISI
SICI code
0176-1714(200002)17:2<247:FDOIIB>2.0.ZU;2-I
Abstract
This paper focuses on the fair division of a set of indivisible items betwe en two people when both have the same linear preference order on the items but may have different preferences over subsets of items. Surprisingly, div isions that are envy-free, Pareto-optimal, and ensure that the less well-of f person does as well as possible (i.e., are equitable) can often be achiev ed. Preferences between subsets are assumed to satisfy axioms of qualitativ e probability without implying the existence of additive utilities, which i s treated as a special case. Algorithms that render fair division practicab le are proposed, and their vulnerability to strategic manipulation is inves tigated.