Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives

Authors
Laslier, JF
Citation
Jf. Laslier, Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives, SOC CHOICE, 17(2), 2000, pp. 269-282
Citations number
22
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
ISSN journal
01761714 → ACNP
Volume
17
Issue
2
Year of publication
2000
Pages
269 - 282
Database
ISI
SICI code
0176-1714(200002)17:2<269:AOPWAV>2.0.ZU;2-Z
Abstract
A social choice correspondence called the Essential set is studied with the help of an axiom called Cloning Consistency. Cloning consistency is the re quirement that the formal choice rule be insensitive to the replication of alternatives. The Essential set is the support of the optimal mixed strateg ies in a symmetric two-party electoral competition game.