Policy-balancing models and the split-ticket voter, 1972-1996

Previous examinations of the policy-balancing explanation for presidential- House split-ticket voting have been unable to sustain two of its basic prop ositions-that splitting should be greater for respondents located between t he parties' ideological positions and for those seeing more interparty dist ance-when each is tested separately. Work by Garand and Licht1, however, su ggests that the between-parties expectation can be supported when both prop ositions are tested in the same equation. Our study demonstrates the essent ially artifactual nature of this result, produced by the strong relationshi p of the between-parties variable to relative party closeness, with interpa rty distance held constant. But 1996 stands out as the one year in which cl ear-cut balancing behavior was manifested by the electorate. Furthermore, s ome backing for a modified version of the policy-balancing idea emerges whe n we take into account respondent perceptions of individual candidates' ide ological positions.