I argue that there is no mind-brain problem but rather that there are
irreducible subjective - objective problems. These include the differe
nce between ''inside'' and ''outside'' perspectives on neural states,
the creation of subjective neural states with objectified outside obje
cts, and awareness of the self as an object in the world. The origin o
f consciousness is traced to the development of meaning states, and de
monstrate how differing perspectives related to these states are mutua
lly irreducible. For instance, neural states are spatiotemporally dist
ributed when observed from the outside, while mental states are unifie
d when experienced from the inside; from the inside neural states are
experienced as outside of themselves; and qualia have a material reali
ty only from the inside. Rather than positing a special substance or i
mmaterial process theory of consciousness, it is argued that the appar
ent immateriality of mind is an artifact of the nature of the phenomen
on and of the process of observation itself.