THE IRREDUCIBLE PERSPECTIVES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Authors
Citation
Te. Feinberg, THE IRREDUCIBLE PERSPECTIVES OF CONSCIOUSNESS, Seminars in neurology, 17(2), 1997, pp. 85-93
Citations number
63
Categorie Soggetti
Clinical Neurology
Journal title
ISSN journal
02718235
Volume
17
Issue
2
Year of publication
1997
Pages
85 - 93
Database
ISI
SICI code
0271-8235(1997)17:2<85:TIPOC>2.0.ZU;2-7
Abstract
I argue that there is no mind-brain problem but rather that there are irreducible subjective - objective problems. These include the differe nce between ''inside'' and ''outside'' perspectives on neural states, the creation of subjective neural states with objectified outside obje cts, and awareness of the self as an object in the world. The origin o f consciousness is traced to the development of meaning states, and de monstrate how differing perspectives related to these states are mutua lly irreducible. For instance, neural states are spatiotemporally dist ributed when observed from the outside, while mental states are unifie d when experienced from the inside; from the inside neural states are experienced as outside of themselves; and qualia have a material reali ty only from the inside. Rather than positing a special substance or i mmaterial process theory of consciousness, it is argued that the appar ent immateriality of mind is an artifact of the nature of the phenomen on and of the process of observation itself.