Local elites and popular support for economic reform in China and India

This article analyzes why it is that China, an authoritarian political syst em, has managed to generate more popular support for the reform process tha n India a democracy. The authors argue that when local politicians and bure aucrats are more supportive of the reform process, there is likely to be gr eater popular support for economic reform. Local political elite may be mor e supportive of reform in an authoritarian than in a democratic system beca use the level of local elite support for the reform process is influenced b y the incentives faced by local elite. In China, institutional reform chang ed the incentives faced by local elite, whereas in India, reforms have not been accompanied by institutional changes that would encourage local elite to support reform to the same extent as in China. The argument is based on local elite and mass surveys conducted in China and India in 1990 and 1996, respectively. A legit model, controlling for a variety of alternative expl anations, provides evidence that local elite support is critical for explai ning whether reforms are popular.