R. Deeg et S. Lutz, Internationalization and financial federalism - The United States and Germany at the crossroads?, COMP POLI S, 33(3), 2000, pp. 374-405
In this article, the authors examine some effects of economic international
ization on state structures, especially in regard to the distribution of po
wer and authority within federalist systems. Using an institutional rationa
l choice model, they analyze changes in financial regulation and market str
uctures in Germany and the United States. The focus is on the financial rea
lm because of its high degree of internationalization and because, in both
countries, financial markets and regulation have historically exhibited fed
eralist traits. The findings indicate that internationalization has led to
significant convergence in financial market structures and regulation acros
s the two countries and that in each case this convergence has been accompa
nied by centralization of financial regulatory authority. Although both the
German type of cooperative federalism and the U.S. model of competitive fe
deralism proved to be vulnerable to the growing international pressures, th
e two countries took different paths of change that reflected differences i
n domestic institutions. Thus, the authors conclude that convergence is, an
d will likely remain, of a limited nature.