This study draws on other studies that concluded OPEC is not a cartel and S
audi Arabia acts as a dominant producer in the world oil market. The intent
ion here is to see whether the Target Revenue (TR) model provides an explan
ation for the behavior of some OPEC members that do not coordinate producti
on with Saudi Arabia. We investigate whether production cuts or increases b
y OPEC and non-OPEC members are based on their investment or budgetary need
s. By, retesting the TR model, we show that investment and budgetary needs
do not affect the production of oil in free-market economies (OPEC and non-
OPEC), but they do affect production decisions of the more centrally-planne
d, isolated and oil-dependent economies. Existing studies in the literature
have conceptual and statistical limitations that justify retesting the mod
el. This study is the first to investigate the TR model in a separate study
and to compare the results of static and dynamic models. It is also the fi
rst to examine the relationship between the degree of economic freedom and
the Target Revenue model and to note the TR model is stable when used for c
ountries that are price takers.