The Republican Revolution and the house Appropriations Committee

This study applies the theory of "conditional party government" to the inte raction between the Republican party and the Appropriations Committee in th e 104th House, seen in the context of developments since the 96th Congress. As expected by the theory, we find that the relatively homogenous preferen ces of the Republican contingent in the House led them to adopt new institu tional arrangements to enhance the powers of their leaders, which in turn w ere used to advance the party's policy goals. Given that the leadership dec ided to use Appropriations as one of the vehicles of major policy change, t hey and the Conference sought to monitor the committee's actions, and to in fluence it to behave as they wanted. The leaders used their enhanced powers over incentives and with regard to the agenda to advance the party cause. Both leaders and the Conference sought to block policy shifts away from wha t they wanted, but facilitated changes in the desired direction. Finally, w e expected to see evidence of the increasing applicability of the theory ov er time, culminating in the developments of the 104th Congress, and this ex pectation was borne out.