For over twenty years Australia has recognized the legitimacy of Indonesia'
s illegal and brutal occupation of East Timer. The decisive influence of th
e Jakarta lobby, a group of bureaucrats, academics, politicians, and journa
lists, ensured that "good relations" between Australia and Indonesia were m
aintained despite Jakarta's egregious human rights record in the territory.
A distorted history of Suharto's rise to power, de jure recognition of Ind
onesia's sovereignty in East Timer, a secretly negotiated security agreemen
t, and strident opposition to East Timer's independence were indicative of
the Jakarta lobby's success in framing Australian foreign policy. However,
after encouraging the Habibie government to resolve the East Timer issue in
late 1998, the Howard government subsequently committed itself to supporti
ng a UN-sponsored ballot in August 1999, when the East Timorese were given
a choice of independence or continued integration with the Republic of Indo
nesia. The escalation of violence orchestrated by the Indonesian military a
nd their militia proxies in response to an overwhelming vote for independen
ce shocked the international community and encouraged the Howard government
to organize and lead a UN-sanetioned multilateral peace enforcement missio
n in East Timer. The success of this deployment in pacifying the territory
led to the departure of Indonesian forces from East Timer and the formal re
voking of Indonesia's sovereign claim to the territory. It also signaled a
break with past Australian diplomatic orthodoxy towards Indonesia and the d
eclining influence of the Jakarta lobby on Australian public policy.