Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments

Auctions provide an efficient way of resolving one-to-many negotiations. Th is is particularly true for automated agents where delays and long communic ations carry negative externalities. A properly designed auction, tailored to the specific needs of the relevant multi-agent system, can significantly improve its performance. In this paper, we focus on the specific problem o f service allocation among autonomous, automated agents, within the context of the ADEPT project, which concerns the BT (British Telecom) business pro cess of providing a quote for designing a network for a customer. The main contributions of this paper are threefold: First, we show how an E nglish auction can be modifed for services, which an multi-dimensional priv ate value objects. Second, we show how, under certain conditions, auctions can be arranged by the service providing agents, in the cases where the ser vice seeking agents fail to do so. We consider the incentives of all partic ipants, and show how such an arrangement can be in their best interest. Fin ally, by examining our results for what is, essentially, an application of game-theory and mechanism design to an existing application, we draw some g eneral conclusions on how such concepts can be operationalized in automated agents. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.