Constitutional doctrine is typically rule-dependent. A viable constitutiona
l challenge typically hinges upon the existence of a discriminatory, overbr
oad, improperly motivated, or otherwise invalid rule, to which the claimant
has some nexus. In a prior article, Professor Adler proposed one model of
constitutional adjudication that tries to make sense of rule-dependence He
argued that reviewing courts are not vindicating the personal rights of cla
imants, but are rather repealing or amending invalid riles. In a Commentary
in this issue, Professor Fallen now puts forward a different model of cons
titutional adjudication, equally consistent with rule-dependence.(1) Fallen
proposes that a reviewing court should overturn the application of a const
itutionally invalid rule to a given claimant if that rule contains MO valid
severable subrule that covers the claimant; and he criticizes Adler's mode
l on various counts. In this Response, Adler replies to Fallen's criticisms
and, more generally, attempts to demonstrate that the Fallen Model is not
supported by a variety of considerations that might seem to favor it. The F
allen Model is a better account of rule-dependence than the Adler Model onl
y if the Fallen Model better implements constitutional norms, and Professor
Fallen has not shown or even tried to shorer that if does.