Who mediates? The political economy of international conflict management

Studies on international mediation have traditionally focused on the effect iveness of international efforts to settle or resolve militarized conflicts . In this article, we start from a different perspective and examine the id entity of mediators and the factors determining the choice of mediators. We build an integrative theoretical framework to explain the number of mediat ion mandates an international actor receives. The hypotheses we derive are subsequently tested in a multivariate event count model using an original d ataset on international mediation from 1950 to 1990. The results obtained f rom Poisson and negative binomial regressions disconfirm the assertion that the effectiveness of a mediator influences the number of mandates it recei ves. The most important structural force on the international mediation mar ker seems to be the hegemonic status of the USA. The analysis further demon strates that international conflict management is largely, but not exclusiv ely, restricted to the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN. As the theoretical framework suggests, ideological factors, such as the ne utrality of the mediator, play a less significant role on the marker for me diation. Democracies equally are not significantly more active than autocra cies in the management of international conflicts.