Ascriptions and pseudoascriptions of mental states

The ascription of normative mental states is an integral part of the psycho logy of development and personality. Pragmatic rules for the ascription of mental states are outlined and a distinction is made between direct and cou nterdefined mental states. According to these rules, counter defined mental states can only be ascribed to persons in a meaningful way when certain co nditions hold. Violations of the rules are called pseudo-ascriptions. Six c ounterdefined, groups of mental states are discussed: secure, self-confiden t, authentic, free, intentional and identity. It is argued that certain psy che-social conditions create the need for ascriptions of these mental state s, and that pseudoascriptions give rise to Cartesian narratives of the self . The rules for the ascription of counterdefined states has implications fo r the universality claims of normative descriptions of developmental psycho logy.