Wittgenstein is famous for eschewing 'scientific' explanations of language
in philosophy and for commending, as an alternative, the examination of ord
inary language, 'the language of everyday'. 'Scientific' explanations shoul
d be avoided, according to Wittgrenstein, because they lead our attention i
nto paradoxical ontologies and away from the one place where solutions and
clear understandings will be found. This desire to avoid going into such on
tological mires I term 'going nowhere' and I suggest that it is one of the
most insightful yet most misunderstood aspects of Wittgenstein's later work
. This paper examines the arguments in favour of 'going nowhere' and in the
process rebuts the charge that Wittgenstein himself was involved in provid
ing explanations. The discussion then focuses on the conceptual benefits to
be gained in psychology from 'going nowhere', including that of the demyst
ification of psychological phenomena. Finally, the paper explores the sense
in which 'going nowhere' leaves psychologists in the 'world' of ordinary l
anguage, an everyday 'world' that is surprisingly robust in the face of irr
ealism without succumbing to the temptations of ontological realism.