In this article, we first examine current cognitive and social construction
ist (SC) notions of self and we suggest that although 'self is central to b
oth approaches, it is not satisfactorily defined by either because the disc
ussion of self remains at an epistemological level. The lack of genuine def
inition leads to difficulties specifying the properties 'self possesses and
to dilemmas about how to draw boundaries between public and private experi
ence and explain that discourse is both personalized yet socially construct
ed. In the second part of the article, we examine phenomenological claims f
or an ontological position which transcends views of the self as a unit 'kn
own about' and which grounds self-knowledge in Being. Being is revealed by
projects in the world and does not distinguish a priori between subject and
object. Such divisions are invoked by projects such as 'knowing the world'
which require a temporal and spatial version of the world in order to come
about. Projects are always in the process of coming about; therefore, self
's defining quality is what it is about to become rather than what it is. H
ence the finite self is an illusion; but a necessary one. We draw an analog
y between the way the illusion of self is created and revealed through the
project of 'knowing the self' and the way a conjuror, through his/her lead-
up, convinces an audience to see what should be there. Only because sense o
f self is an illusion, we speculate, can it exert such a powerful sway over
our lives.