People who suffer from eating disorders often have to be treated against th
eir will, perhaps by being detained, perhaps by being forced to eat. In thi
s paper it is argued that whilst forcing compliance is generally acceptable
there may be circumstances under which a sufferer's refusal of consent to
treatment should be respected This argument will hinge upon whether someone
in the grip of an eating disorder can actually make competent decisions ab
out their quality of life. If so, then the decision to refuse therapy may b
e on a par with other decisions to refuse life-prolonging therapy made by s
ufferers of debilitating chronic, or acute onset terminal illness. In such
cases, palliation might justifiably replace aggressive therapy. The argumen
t will also draw heavily on the distinction between competent refusal of th
erapy and passive euthanasia, and the distinction between incompetent and i
rrational decisions. Both distinctions will then be applied to decisions to
refuse food. The extent to which sufferers from anorexia nervosa can be ca
tegorised as either incompetent or irrational will be examined. Tt is again
st this background that it will be argued that at least some of those who s
uffer from eating disorders should have their refusals respected, even if t
hey may die as a result.