Since the first attempts at campaign finance reform almost a century ago, t
wo different threads have emerged as ways to structure a reform regime. One
strand, the supply side, has attempted to solve the campaign finance dilem
ma by trying to limit the overall supply of private money in the political
system. The other strand, the demand side, has approached the problem from
the other direction, hy decreasing politicians' demand and desire for priva
te money. This Note then argues that most efforts to reform campaign financ
e have failed because of an over-emphasis on the supply sine. Future reform
efforts should recognize that money will always Jinn a way into the politi
cal system. Unless the politicians' demand for private money decreases, thr
ough such measures as public financing, disclosure, and increased FEC enfor
cement, any reform will fail because history and reality have shown the ine
ffectiveness of installing artificial supply-side limits on the campaign fi
nance system. Since Buckley v. Valeo permits these types of demand-side ref
orms, a continuation of the Buckley regime still allows enough flexibility
to implement a comprehensive reform strategy.