Since 1979, Guangdong has been a laboratory in China's economic reform proc
ess, testing various reform policies and their political limits. In the 199
0s, the thrust of China's economic reform has been transforming slate enter
prises into independent legal entities responsible for their own profits an
d losses. Re-defining government functions is both a prerequisite and a log
ical consequence of such reforms of state enterprises. The objective is to
separate government from enterprises, and to promote "small government, big
society". Guangdong's success in economic restructuring has enabled it to
make satisfactory progress in organizational streamlining. However, corrupt
ion has been rampant in the province, attracting central interference, tarn
ishing its reputation and that of its leaders. Reducing the size of the bur
eaucracy is supposed to facilitate improvements in remuneration for civil s
ervants and eventually contribute to combat corruption. The complex interac
tions of the above also raise the fundamental question of die limitations o
f the reforms in the absence of democratization.