Inhibition of the literal: Metaphors and idioms as judgmental primes

Four experiments demonstrate that priming effects depend on the context-app ropriate meaning of the prime words. Most studies of semantic construct act ivation have presented prime words in contexts where the meaning of each wo rd was invariant (e.g., word puzzles). in this research, we used words in c ontexts that supported either literal or figurative meanings, and found tha t only the context-appropriate meanings had subsequent priming effects on p erson-perception judgments. In Experiment 1, participants read the word "fi re" in one of three contexts: a figurative use that implied recklessness (" playing with fire"), a figurative use referring to a hot streak ("on fire") , or a literal use ("playing by the fire"). Differential priming effects we re obtained in a subsequent person-perception task that were consistent wit h the context-appropriate meanings of the priming expression. In Experiment 2, a conventional idiom, "break a leg," produced divergent priming effects when used idiomatically than when used literally. In addition, we found ev idence for inhibition of irrelevant literal meanings in Experiments 3a and 3b that provided support for the role of inhibitory processes in metaphor a nd idiom comprehension. Implications for how figurative language might diff erentially activate knowledge structures and the role of inhibitory process es in social perception are discussed.