This essay is in part a response to the rhetoric of the 'two cultures' revi
ved by the 'science wars' conducted in recent years through the mass media
against humanities disciplines, especially 'post-modern' art, cultural stud
ies, and non-analytic philosophy. The essay focuses in greatest detail on t
he relation between science and philosophy, arguing that they are in fact c
omplementary activities effectively partaking of the same reality. Although
knowledge practices in the humanities draw from their partaking radically
different orders of result from those of science (and from each other), the
y have claim to an effective connection to a shared reality. Humanities dis
ciplines, and even 'informal' or 'traditional' knowledge practices, can be
argued to be realist, empirical enterprises generating modes of validity sp
ecific to their manner of result - provided that the definition of empirica
l reality is generously broadened. An 'expanded' empiricism is a 'radical'
empiricism in William James's sense of taking relations to be as real and a
s fundamentally given to experience as discrete objects or sense-data. Reco
gnizing the reality of relation nudges empiricism in the direction of proce
ss philosophy. The essay reviews concepts of cause and discovery, nature an
d culture, affect and virtuality, truth and constructedness, taking the exp
erience of colour as a prime example. It combines elements of James's radic
al empiricism with Whitehead's process philosophy with the poststructuralis
m of Deleuze and Guattari with chaos and complexity theory. The resulting p
erspective converges with Isabelle Stengers' vision of a non-judgemental po
litical ecology of knowledge. An expansive ethics of relationality, of mutu
al differential belonging, is the natural correlate of an expanded culture
of empiricism.