Phenomenal experience: A fundamental problem for psychology and the neurosciences

In the present article, we try to show in which specific sense consciousnes s represents a problem for which psychology and the neurosciences have no t heoretical explanation and no methodological approach. In experimental stud ies, consciousness is often defined as a state or process coupled to focal attention that allows for self-referential, metacognitive processing and ot her higher-level cognitive operations. This concept reduces consciousness t o relatively "simple" problems that can principally be addressed by convent ional approaches within the natural sciences. However, it does not bear on a central and more difficult aspect of the problem: The emergence and funct ion of phenomenal experience, that is: of "qualia." We demonstrate that thi s problem seems presently insoluble and argue that it points to a fundament al gap of knowledge in psychology and the natural sciences that must be tak en seriously.