Complex demonstratives, expressions of the form "That F," "These Fs," etc.,
have traditionally been taken to be referring terms. Yet they exhibit many
of the features of quantified noun phrases. This has led some philosophers
to suggest that demonstrative determiners are a special kind of quantifier
, which can be paraphrased using a context sensitive definite description.
Both these views contain elements of the truth, though each is mistaken. We
advance a novel account of the semantic form of complex demonstratives tha
t shows how to reconcile the view that they function like quantified noun p
hrases with the view that simple demonstratives function as context sensiti
ve referring terms wherever they occur. If we are right, previous accounts
of complex demonstratives have misconceived their semantic role; and philos
ophers relying on the majority view in employing complex demonstratives in
analysis have proceeded on a false assumption.