C. Boix, POLITICAL-PARTIES AND THE SUPPLY-SIDE OF THE ECONOMY - THE PROVISION OF PHYSICAL AND HUMAN-CAPITAL IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES, 1960-90, American journal of political science, 41(3), 1997, pp. 814-845
Theory: Partisan tenure of government (in contrast to institutionalist
and structural approaches) is used to explain the nature of governmen
tal strategies to affect the supply side of the economy-the provision
of the input factors, capital and labor. Hypotheses: Supply-side econo
mic strategies are a function of the party in office. Left-wing govern
ments spend heavily in physical and human capital formation to raise t
he productivity of factors and the competitiveness of the economy. Rig
ht-wing governments rely instead on private agents to maximize economi
c growth. The organization of the domestic political economy and the i
nternational economy, which place heavy limits on the capacity of part
ies to affect the conduct of macroeconomic policies, hardly constrain
the choice of supply-side economic strategies. Methods: Regression ana
lysis of data for levels of public spending on gross fixed capital for
mation and on education in OECD nations from 1960 to 1990. Results: Su
pply-side policies conform to partisan preferences throughout the peri
od examined. The institutional configuration of the economy affected p
olicies jointly with government partisanship until the oil shock but n
ot afterwards. Economic openness does not constrain the choice of supp
ly-side policies.