Ls. Rothenberg et Ms. Sanders, Legislator turnout and the calculus of voting: The determinants of abstention in the US Congress, PUBL CHOICE, 103(3-4), 2000, pp. 259-270
The belief that turnout and abstention depend on the interaction of the ben
efits and costs of voting is one of the longest held in public choice. The
interplay between benefits and costs has typically been studied within the
context of voter turnout in elections, but these results are confounded by
the fact that participation in such elections is a low-cost, low-benefit ac
tivity. Analysis of voting in legislatures, where the potential returns and
costs to participants are greater, is more promising.
This paper examines participation on roll calls in the U.S. House of Repres
entatives during the recent 104th Congress (1995-1996). We analyze all cont
ested roll calls during this two-year period, using a negative binomial cou
nt model that accounts for legislator heterogeneity, to determine what fact
ors associated with such votes induce turnout. Our results suggest that, wh
ile turnout is predictable, its primary explanation does not lie with our s
tandard calculation of expected benefits. We find that the ideological pola
rization of the roll call alternatives is not a very important factor for t
urnout and, even more strikingly and contrary to what past analysis has imp
lied, the likelihood of any given legislator being pivotal is completely ir
relevant. Rather, what is most important is that a non-trivial number of me
mbers of Congress decide not to vote when contextual factors force them to
choose between electioneering and legislating. Consequently, while our resu
lts are not sufficient to induce a full-fledged "paradox of congressional v
oting'' analogous to that of mass voting, they do indicate that participati
on in Congress depends most heavily on factors beyond a desire to affect th
e outcome.