Causality, a draft of realistic theory

Authors
Citation
B. Borstner, Causality, a draft of realistic theory, FILOZ VESTN, 20(3), 1999, pp. 107-124
Citations number
29
Categorie Soggetti
Philosiphy
Journal title
FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK-ACTA PHILOSOPHICA
ISSN journal
03534510 → ACNP
Volume
20
Issue
3
Year of publication
1999
Pages
107 - 124
Database
ISI
SICI code
0353-4510(1999)20:3<107:CADORT>2.0.ZU;2-X
Abstract
In this paper we are seeking a theory that will(at least) implicitly define the concept of causation. A theory of causation must be analytically true and should offer an analysis of the concept of causation that must be true in all possible worlds(not just in the actual one). Our goal is not the the ory that is just contingently true. It is proposed that causality is a relation that is observable(in Hume's se nse) and is not reducible to other(observable) properties and relations, be tween individual events. Thus after some basic features of causality, causa l relation, causal necessitation and nomic necessity are defined on the bas is of the assumption of the singularist theory of causation, which does not exclude the possibility that there are laws of nature of which singular ca usal relations are instances. The causal explanation(why) is not reduced to the nomological explanation(how) because the existence of causal relation does not by itself guarantee the existence of the law of nature.