War initiators and war winners - The consequences of linking theories of democratic war success

Some scholars argue that once democracies enter wars, they fight more effec tively than do their autocratic counterparts. Others suggest that democrati c states may win wars because they choose their opponents carefully predisp osing themselves to victory. Both are plausible, and it is possible that th ey are both correct. This study examines the possibility that these explana tions are complementary and that omitting one or the other from empirical a nalysis may have consequences for inference. To assess the possible consequ ences of considering these explanations individually, the authors perform M onte Carlo experiments. The empirical results strongly suggest two importan t consequences. First, if democracies do not choose their fights any differ ently from other states, then estimates of the effect of democratic war-fig hting ability are likely to be unbiased. Second, if democracies do choose t heir fights differently, then the effects of democratic war-fighting abilit y may be substantially over estimated.