The authors examined the role of cognitive-resource allocation in obtaining
the often reported memory advantage for bizarre relative to common informa
tion by using the secondary-task method in 4 experiments. In Experiments 1
and 2, they investigated the relationship between differences in cognitive
resource allocation during comprehension and in recall for common and bizar
re information. In Experiments 3 and 4, they investigated the same relation
ship but measured cognitive-resource allocation during imaging rather than
during comprehension. Although bizarre items required more time to comprehe
nd and to image than did common items, the differences were not reliable pr
edictors of the recall differences between item types. Furthermore, analyse
s of response latencies to a secondary task provided no compelling evidence
in support of a cognitive-resource-allocation explanation of bizarreness e
ffects. Implications for the development of a comprehensive model of the in
fluence of bizarreness on memory are discussed.