Symmetric tragedies: Commons and anticommons

An anticommons problem arises when there exist multiple rights to exclude. In a lengthy law review paper, Michael A. Heller has examined "The Tragedy of the Anticommons," especially in regard to disappointing experiences with efforts to shift from socialist to market institutions in Russia. In an ea rly footnote, Heller suggests that a formal economic model of the anticommo ns has not been developed. This paper responds to Heller's challenge. We an alyze the anticommons problem in which resources are inefficiently underuti lized rather than overutilized, as in the familiar commons setting. The two problems are shown to be symmetrical in several respects. We present an al gebraic and geometric illustration and extend the discussion to several app lications. Of greater importance, we suggest that the construction is helpf ul in understanding the sources of major value wastage in modern regulatory bureaucracy.