The question of why receivers accept a selfish signaller's message as relia
ble or 'honest' has fuelled ample controversy in discussions of communicati
on. The handicap mechanism is now widely accepted as a potent constraint on
cheating. Handicap signals are deemed reliable by their costs: signallers
must choose between investing in the signal or in other aspects of fitness.
Accordingly, resources allocated to the signal came to reflect the signall
er's fitness budget and, on average, cheating is uneconomic. However, that
signals may also be deemed reliable by their design, regardless of costs, i
s not widely appreciated. Here we briefly describe indices and amplifiers,
reliable signals that may be essentially cost free. Indices are reliable be
cause they bear a direct association with the signalled quality rather than
costs. Amplifiers do not directly provide information about signaller qual
ity, but they facilitate assessment by increasing the apparency of pre-exis
ting cues and signals that are associated with quality. We present results
of experiments involving a jumping spider (Plexippus paykulli) to illustrat
e how amplifiers can facilitate assessment of cues associated with physical
condition without invoking the costs required for handicap signalling.