Reality and discourse: A critical analysis of the category of 'delusions'

Delusions are seen in psychiatric research and practice as central indicato rs of the psychotic loss of contact with reality. In this paper the psychia tric concept of 'delusions' is critically examined both theoretically and t hrough the analysis of extracts from interviews with individuals diagnosed as 'delusional'. The diagnostic criteria for delusions, implausibility, idi osyncrasy, conviction and incorrigibility, are scrutinized, and the notion of reality that underlies the concept of delusions is deconstructed through the use of social constructionist approaches. The main arguments pursued i n the paper are: first, that delusions are meaningful, not: because they ex press something about the world or the speaker, but rather because they emp loy culturally available discourses and discursive strategies for their con struction; second, that delusions are claims which are argued and negotiate d in speech with similar strategies to those used by 'non-delusional' indiv iduals; and third, that delusions are statements about the self and the wor ld whose truth and falsity cannot be definitely settled in speech. All thre e claims are discussed through the analysis of extracts from two interviews with 'delusional' individuals, which focuses on the assumptions underlying the negotiation of claims on reality, the discursive strategies adopted in this negotiation and the way disputes on reality are conversationally prod uced and settled.