WHEN STRONG EVIDENCE HAS LESS IMPACT THAN WEAK EVIDENCE - BIAS, ADJUSTMENT, AND INSTRUCTIONS TO IGNORE

Authors
Citation
Y. Schul et H. Goren, WHEN STRONG EVIDENCE HAS LESS IMPACT THAN WEAK EVIDENCE - BIAS, ADJUSTMENT, AND INSTRUCTIONS TO IGNORE, Social cognition, 15(2), 1997, pp. 133-155
Citations number
36
Categorie Soggetti
Psychology, Social
Journal title
ISSN journal
0278016X
Volume
15
Issue
2
Year of publication
1997
Pages
133 - 155
Database
ISI
SICI code
0278-016X(1997)15:2<133:WSEHLI>2.0.ZU;2-9
Abstract
Results from three experiments show that individuals who are asked to ignore a strong testimony ''overadjust'' their judgments relative to t hose asked io ignore testimony with a milder persuasive impact. Partic ipants made jury decisions after reading several testimonies, one of w h ich provided either strong or weak evidence for the defendant's guil t. Relative to the weak testimony, the strong testimony led to higher judgments of guilt when participants were instructed to use it, but lo wer judgments of guilt when participants were instructed to ignore it. Strength of the critical testimony was manipulated through the confid ence of the witness (Experiment 1), linguistic cues to the witness's a ge (Experiment 2), and the abnormality of the defendant's actions (Exp eriment 3). Results are interpreted as supporting previous theories ab out awareness of cognitive processes and how individuals adjust belief s.