Y. Schul et H. Goren, WHEN STRONG EVIDENCE HAS LESS IMPACT THAN WEAK EVIDENCE - BIAS, ADJUSTMENT, AND INSTRUCTIONS TO IGNORE, Social cognition, 15(2), 1997, pp. 133-155
Results from three experiments show that individuals who are asked to
ignore a strong testimony ''overadjust'' their judgments relative to t
hose asked io ignore testimony with a milder persuasive impact. Partic
ipants made jury decisions after reading several testimonies, one of w
h ich provided either strong or weak evidence for the defendant's guil
t. Relative to the weak testimony, the strong testimony led to higher
judgments of guilt when participants were instructed to use it, but lo
wer judgments of guilt when participants were instructed to ignore it.
Strength of the critical testimony was manipulated through the confid
ence of the witness (Experiment 1), linguistic cues to the witness's a
ge (Experiment 2), and the abnormality of the defendant's actions (Exp
eriment 3). Results are interpreted as supporting previous theories ab
out awareness of cognitive processes and how individuals adjust belief
s.