We study the role of unemployment in the context of the endogeneous formati
on of a monocentric city in which firms set efficiency wages to deter shirk
ing. We first show that, in equilibrium, the employed locate at the vicinit
y of the city-center, the unemployed reside at the city-edge and firms set
up in the city-center. We then show that there is a 'spatial mismatch' betw
een location and jobs because the further away from jobs the unemployed, th
e larger the level of unemployment, Finally, we derive some policy implicat
ions. We show that a policy that improves the city transportation network (
by subsidizing the commuting costs of all workers) reduces urban unemployme
nt, increases utilities of all workers but raises inequality whereas a poli
cy that supports the transportation of the unemployed only (by subsidizing
their commuting costs) increases urban unemployment, does not always raise
workers' utilities but reduces inequality. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. A
ll rights reserved.