The telecommunications industry in emerging markets has been transformed fr
om a collection of mostly state-owned, national companies to one with many
privately owned, multinational corporations (MNCs). Using examples from Lat
in America, this dramatic reconfiguration is explained as resulting from th
e dynamic inter-play between country and firm strategies. it is further arg
ued that first-mover MNCs reaped greater profits than late-mover MNCs, wher
eas timing had the opposite consequence or host countries. First-mover MNCs
had the advantage of buying the incumbent stare enterprise, enjoying monop
oly privileges, making preemptive investments, leveraging political connect
ions, and adopting entry-deterring policies to minimize competition. But ea
rly-reforming countries had to contend with the region's lack of credibilit
y with investors by deeply discounting sale price, offering special privile
ges and protections, and absorbing risks that late-reforming countries were
able to pass on to MNCs. The paper concludes that telecommunications no lo
nger offers foreign investors easy riches like those enjoyed by first-movin
g MNCs in first-reforming countries. Late-moving firms, especially in late-
reforming countries, are exposed not only to governments with higher bargai
ning power but also to greater regulatory and competitive risks.