This paper examines the effects of the social context of economic exchange
on the governance of transactions In buyer-supplier relations between firms
. We distinguish three dimensions of social embeddedness of transactions, n
amely, repeated exchange between the partners (temporal embeddedness), rela
tions with third parties such as other firms (network embeddedness) and soc
ial institutions that allow for credible agreements and commitments (instit
utional embeddedness). Together with transaction characteristics, social em
beddedness shapes trust problems in economic exchange and how firms mitigat
e such trust problems through contractual planning. More precisely, we anal
yse how transaction characteristics and social embeddedness affect effort i
nvested in contractual planning. We argue that social embeddedness provides
alternatives for costly contractual planning, such as reciprocity and cond
itional co-operation. Forty purchase managers participated in a factorial s
urvey. Virtual transactions were presented. Each transaction was represente
d by a vignette composed of eight characteristics, the levels of which were
varied randomly. Three characteristics represented 'economic' features of
transactions, namely, transaction-specific investments, monitoring problems
and volume of the transaction. Five vignette characteristics represented s
ocial embeddedness: the history of previous transactions between the partne
rs, expected future transactions, voice and exit networks and a rough indic
ator of institutional embeddedness. The purchase managers had to judge how
much time negotiations would take, and also how many departments would be i
nvolved, Results show that social embeddedness leads a purchase manager to
put less effort into the management of the transaction. While one-sided spe
cific investments, monitoring problems and the Volume of a transaction indu
ce more negotiation efforts, such efforts decrease if transactions are embe
dded 'better' in a temporal or network sense, or if buyer and supplier can
rely on more institutional embeddedness.