The primacy of self-referent information in perceptions of social consensus

People's own responses to a social stimulus (i.e, whether they endorse it o r reject it) predict how they expect other people to respond (consensus est imates). This correlation has long been accepted as evidence for social pro jection. There has been little direct evidence, however, for the assumption that self-referent judgments shape judgments about others. Supporting the projection model, Expt 1 shows that self-referent information is more acces sible than consensus estimates. Once they have been made, people's own endo rsements and rejections of a stimulus facilitate consensus estimates. In tu rn, consensus estimates facilitate endorsements (but less so). Judgments ab out the physical properties of the stimulus facilitate neither type of soci al judgment. Supporting the view that projection is egocentric, Expt 2 show s that, when making consensus estimates, people rely more on their own endo rsements than on the endorsements made by another individual. This self-oth er difference does not depend on whose endorsements are revealed first or o n whether the other person is anonymous or individuated.