Democratic governance beyond the nation-state: The EU and other international institutions

Authors
Citation
M. Zurn, Democratic governance beyond the nation-state: The EU and other international institutions, EUR J INT R, 6(2), 2000, pp. 183-221
Citations number
124
Categorie Soggetti
Politucal Science & public Administration
Journal title
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ISSN journal
13540661 → ACNP
Volume
6
Issue
2
Year of publication
2000
Pages
183 - 221
Database
ISI
SICI code
1354-0661(200006)6:2<183:DGBTNT>2.0.ZU;2-V
Abstract
International institutions not only increase system effectiveness or output legitimacy, but are also a normatively plausible response to the problems for democracy that are caused by globalization. In this way, international institutions also increase input legitimacy. It is therefore a false approa ch to pin down the problem of democracy beyond the nation-state as a choice between 'effective problem-solving through international institutions' and 'democratic political processes'. At the same time, it is indisputable tha t the actual functioning of these international institutions does not meet democratic standards. By correctly painting to the deficits of current inte rnational institutions, sceptics too quickly conclude that most deficits in the working of international institutions cannot be remedied. The sceptica l argument is founded on two more or less explicit background hypotheses th at can be empirically challenged. The first background hypothesis states th at a demos cannot exist at the transnational level. I will modify this stat ement in theoretical terms and offer some conceptual distinctions that may prepare the ground for further empirical investigation. The second backgrou nd hypothesis of the sceptics postulates a zero-sum relationship between na tional sovereignty and supranadonality. I will put forward some concrete in stitutional proposals that undermine the zero-sum logic of the sceptics, co ncluding that in a denationalized society, democratic legitimacy can only b e achieved by a mixed constitution comprising majority procedures and negot iation mechanisms.