RECIPROCITY AS A CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT DEVICE - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE

Citation
E. Fehr et al., RECIPROCITY AS A CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT DEVICE - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE, Econometrica, 65(4), 1997, pp. 833-860
Citations number
25
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,"Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods","Mathematical, Methods, Social Sciences","Statistic & Probability","Mathematics, Miscellaneous
Journal title
ISSN journal
00129682
Volume
65
Issue
4
Year of publication
1997
Pages
833 - 860
Database
ISI
SICI code
0012-9682(1997)65:4<833:RAACED>2.0.ZU;2-Y
Abstract
Numerous experimental studies indicate that people tend to reciprocate favors and punish unfair behavior. It is hypothesized that these beha vioral responses contribute to the enforcement of contracts and, hence , increase gains from trade. It turns out that if only one side of the market has opportunities for reciprocal responses, the impact of reci procity on contract enforcement depends on the details of the pecuniar y incentive system. If both sides of the market have opportunities for reciprocal responses, robust and powerful reciprocity effects occur. In particular, reciprocal behavior causes a substantial increase in th e set of enforceable actions and, hence, large efficiency gains.