The egalitarian solution for convex games: some characterizations

The egalitarian solution for TU-games as introduced by Dutta and Ray [Dutta , B., Ray, D., 1989. A concept of egalitarianism under participation constr aints, Econometrica 57, 615-635] is studied. Five characterizations of the restriction of this solution to the class of convex games are given. They a ll involve a stability property due to the concept of the equal division co re from Selten [Selten, R., 1972. Equal share analysis of characteristic fu nction experiments. In: Sauermann, H. (Ed.), Beitrage zur experimentellen W irtschaftsforschung, Vol. 3, J.C.B. Mohr, Tubingen, pp. 130-165] and all bu t the third characterization involve a property restricting maximum payoffs . The first two characterizations use in addition efficiency and the reduce d game properties of Hart and Mas-Colell [Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A., 1989. P otential, value and consistency. Econometrica 57, 589-614] and Davis and Ma schler [Davis, M., Maschler, M., 1965. The kernel of a cooperative game. Na val Research Logistics Quarterly 12, 223-259], respectively. The fourth and fifth characterization only need in addition weak variants of the reduced game properties mentioned above. The third characterization involves beside s the stability condition, efficiency and a new consistency property. (C) 2 000 Elsevier Science BN. All rights reserved.