The design argument for the existence of God is often criticized for restin
g on anthropocentrism. Some critics maintain that anthropocentrism explains
the origin of the design argument. Such critics commit the genetic fallacy
. Others say anthropocentrism explains the appeal of the belief that human
beings are ends especially worthy of creation. They fail to appreciate that
the design argument need not be framed in terms of the fitness of the univ
erse for humanity. Lastly, some say the design argument requires a picture
of value according to which it was true, prior to the coming-into-being of
the universe, that our sort of universe is worthy of creation. Such a pictu
re, they say, is mistaken, though our attraction to it can be explained in
terms of anthropocentrism. This is a serious criticism. To respond to it, p
roponents of the design argument must either defend an objectivist concepti
on of value or, if not, provide some independent reason for thinking an int
elligent designer is likely to create our sort of universe.