Ad. Galinsky et Gb. Moskowitz, Counterfactuals as behavioral primes: Priming the simulation heuristic andconsideration of alternatives, J EXP S PSY, 36(4), 2000, pp. 384-409
We demonstrate that counterfactuals prime a mental simulation mind-set in w
hich relevant but potentially converse alternatives are considered and that
this mind-set activation has behavioral consequences. This mind-set is clo
sely related to the simulation heuristic (Kahneman SZ Tversky, 1982). Parti
cipants primed with a counterfactual were more likely to solve the Duncker
candle problem (Experiment 1), suggesting that they noticed an alternative
function for one of the objects, an awareness that is critical to solving t
he problem. Participants primed with a counterfactual were more likely to s
imultaneously affirm the consequent and select the potentially falsifying c
ard, but without selecting the irrelevant card, in the Wason card selection
task, suggesting that they were testing both the stated conditional and it
s reverse (Experiment 2). The increased affirmations of the consequent decr
eased correct solutions on the task-thus, the primed mind-set can bias or d
ebias thought and action. Finally, Experiment 3 provides further evidence t
hat counterfactual primes increase the accessibility of relevant alternativ
es. Counterfactual primes attenuated the confirmation bias in a trait hypot
hesis testing context by increasing the selection of questions designed to
elicit hypothesis-disconfirming answers, but without increasing the selecti
on of neutral questions. The nature of priming effects and the role of coun
terfactual thinking in biasing and debiasing thought and action are discuss
ed. (C) 2000 Academic Press.