Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfectinformation

This paper provides an alternative approach to the existence of subgame-per fect equilibria with public randomization in continuous games of almost per fect information. Using the theory of weak integration, I study the topolog ical properties of the continuation correspondences that describe the futur e evolution of play in any given stage of the game. This allows me to gener alize to an infinite-dimensional setting the results of Simon and Zame [Sim on, L.K., Zame, W.R., 1990. Discontinuous games and endogenous sharing rule s. Econometrica 58, 861-872] on games with endogenous sharing rules. Thereb y, I obtain a reformulation of the backward induction program for games of almost perfect information. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reser ved. JEL classification: C6; C7.