This article brings moral analysis to bear on the distinctive problem of ma
intaining the protection of nan-combatants in contemporary warfare. While a
ll warfare imposes burdens on non-combatants, moral tradition and the law o
f armed conflicts distinguish combatants from non-combatants and seek to pr
otect the latter from direct, intended attacks. Much contemporary warfare r
ejects the two premises on which these efforts are based: that it is right
and necessary to distinguish beta;een combatants and non-combatants in a so
ciety at way and that it is necessary to distinguish direct, intended harm
to non-combatants from 'collateral' harm that non-combatants may suffer fro
m properly directed and intended military actions. Indeed, as exemplified b
y numerous contemporary conflicts (e.g. Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Northern
Ireland) inflamed by ethnic, religious, or ideological rivalries, recent w
arfare often reveals a pattern in which the armed forces of one or both sid
es directly and intentionally attack non-combatants as a preferred means of
making war. The article addresses this problem in five steps, which define
the article's five major sections: first, an analysis of the problem of wa
rfare on non-combatants in moral terms drawn from the just war tradition; s
econd, an examination of the historical development of non-combatant protec
tion and the reasons for it in this tradition; third, a summary look at the
protection of non-combatants in positive international law, from the law o
f armed conflicts through the ideas of crimes against humanity and genocide
; fourth, an examination of the problem of warfare on non-combatants in two
contemporary conflicts, those in Rwanda-Zaire and tbe former Yugoslavia; a
nd fifth, a concluding section of moral argument for the importance of main
taining the protection of non-combatants in armed conflicts.