The new practice of UN-authorized interventions: A slippery slope of forcible interference?

The topic of this article is the changing scope of the principle of non-int ervention Whereas the principle of non-intervention was previously honored as the most appropriate principle for the regulation of interstate relation s, various concerns have recently been advanced as justifications for inter ventions. This suggests that the scope of die principle of non-intervention has gone through important modifications since die end of the Cold War. Th e scope for justified resort to force has expanded accordingly. The article has a double aim. Fir st, I depict what seem to be emerging criteria for j ustified interventions. The UN Security Council practice of authorizing int erventions suggests that states may lose their claim to protection under th e principle of non-intervention if one or more of the following conditions have been met: (1) the state engages in systematic human rights violations; (2) it is incapable of protecting human rights violations due to breakdown of state authority; (3) the government in power is unlaw-fully constituted . When these conditions have been present, the Security Council has conside red the situation a 'threat to the peace' and thus has the legal powers to authorize enforcement measures under Chapter VII. The second aim of the art icle is to discuss the danger that, by softening the principle of non-inter vention, the UN may get on a slippery slope of forcible interference. One r eason for resisting a softening of the principle of non-intervention is tha t once interventions are allowed for some normatively defensible purposes, it will be difficult to establish barriers against a further softening of t his principle, which may eventually have intolerable consequences. I argue, however, that the slope of UN-authorized interventions is not that slipper y after all. Consequently: the dangers of entering them in the first place are not overwhelming.