Voluntary agri-environmental schemes based on management agreements charact
erise much agri-environmental policy across the EU at present, and have exp
anded following the implementation of Regulation 2078/92 in all member stat
es. Schemes generally motivate individual farmers to contract with governme
nt agencies to produce countryside goods in return for compensatory payment
s. Hence, farmers' decisions to participate are central to achieving policy
objectives. An enhanced understanding of farmers' attitudes to and percept
ions of schemes and their implementation would be of value for policy devel
opment. Recent transactions-cost research has observed that such schemes in
volve potentially heavy transactions costs, for both the state and farmers.
In addition to reducing scheme cost-effectiveness, the transactions costs
incurred by farmers can form a significant constraint on participation in s
chemes, with adverse effects on the supply of conservation goods. This pape
r considers behavioural and transactional perspectives on scheme participat
ion. Some new data on the transactional burdens experienced by farmers when
participating in schemes is examined from the perspective of identifying w
ays to improve policy transacting to ease constraints on participation wher
e these exist. At the level of the individual participant, the development
of agri-environmental one-stop-shops in member states for all schemes would
allow transactions-cost economies, saving on the overhead costs of applyin
g to different schemes with different objectives, as well as allowing a mor
e integrated, less confused approach to participation. The longer-term valu
e of farmer networks and capacity-building for agri-environmental managemen
t is important too. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.