New genetic technologies continue to emerge that allow us to control the ge
netic endowment of future children. Increasingly the claim is made that it
is morally "irresponsible" for parents to fail to use such technologies whe
n they know their possible children are at risk for a serious genetic disor
der. We believe such charges are often unwarranted. Our goal in this articl
e is to offer a careful conceptual analysis of the language of irresponsibi
lity in an effort to encourage more care in its use. Two Of OUT more import
ant sub-claims are: (1) A fair judgment of genetic irresponsibility necessa
rily requires a thick background description of the specific reproductive c
hoice; and (2) there is no necessary connection between an act's being mora
lly wrong and its being irresponsible. These are distinct judgments requiri
ng distinct justifications.