Evolutionary epistemology, social epistemology, and the demic structure ofscience

One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as a Process (Hull 1 988) is determining the relationship between the various elements of Hull's theory. In particular, it is hard to understand precisely how conceptual s election is related to Hull's account of the social dynamics of science. Th is essay aims to clarify the relation between these aspects of his theory b y examining his discussion of the "demic structure" of science. I conclude that the social account can do significant explanatory work independently o f the selectionist account. Further, I maintain that Hull's treatment of th e demic structure of science points us toward an important set of issues in social epistemology. If my reading of Science as a Process is correct, the n most of Hull's critics (e.g., those who focus solely on his account of co nceptual selection) have ignored promising aspects of his theory.